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RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION COSTS: WHO 
PAYS AND HOW MUCH? 
Paul Vercruyssen* 
Abstract: Over the past decade major public policy concerns over the 
environment, national security, the economy, and climate change have 
converged, creating significant pressure to reform America’s energy system. The 
result has been a tremendous increase in the use of renewable energy sources 
with growth only expected to accelerate. This new development represents a 
radical shift for a nation whose electricity system was built to run on fossil fuels 
and hydroelectric dams. The electricity grid is a complex interconnected system 
requiring constant balancing of supply and demand. Using new intermittent 
technologies like solar and wind requires changes in grid management to 
maintain a constant energy balance in real-time. This comment analyzes 
proposed solutions for the integration of renewable resources into the electricity 
grid, and the legal and regulatory steps required to achieve this integration. 
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I.  RENEWABLE INTEGRATION OVERVIEW 
Over the past decade major public policy concerns including 
air pollution and climate change have converged, creating 
significant pressure to reform America’s energy system.1 The 
result has been a tremendous increase in the use of renewable 
energy sources with growth only expected to accelerate.2 
Looking to the future, President Obama recently set a goal for 
the United States to derive 85% of its electricity from clean 
energy sources.3 These developments represent radical shifts 
for a nation whose electricity system was built to run on fossil 
fuels and hydroelectric dams.4 Incumbent technologies should 
not be expected to yield ground willingly, and these changes 
will not come without growing pains. Advocates for renewable 
technologies have long complained of numerous obstacles that 
tilt the playing field in favor of conventional technologies. Over 
                                                
* J.D., University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2011. 
1. See, e.g., Kelsey Jae Nunez, Gridlock on the Road to Renewable Energy 
Development: A Discussion About the Opportunities & Risks Presented by the 
Modernization Requirements of the Electricity Transmission Network, 1 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 137, 141-154 (2007). 
2. U.N. Envtl. Programme, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Global Trends in 
Sustainable Energy Finance, 22, ISBN 978-92-807-3085-2 (2010) [hereinafter UNEP 
Report], available at http://sefi.unep.org/fileadmin/media/sefi/docs/publications/ 
UNEP_GTR_2010.pdf. 
3. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 201100047 (Jan. 25, 2011) available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100047/pdf/DCPD-201100047.pdf. 
4. Darrell Blakeway & Carol Brotman White, Tapping the Power of Wind: FERC 
Initiatives to Facilitate Transmission of Wind Power, 26 ENERGY L.J. 393, 412 (2005). 
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time different obstacles have been removed and new obstacles 
have arisen.5 
This is not the first time that incumbents in the electric 
power industry have felt pressure from new market 
participants. Most electric companies in the United States 
began as private enterprises seeking to monopolize this new 
market for electricity, focusing the services on dense urban 
populations. Bringing the power to the people took the 
intervention of the government. Major federal projects like the 
Bonneville Power Administration and legislation like the 
Rural Electrification Act reshaped the face of the nation by 
bringing electricity to places that the incumbent private 
utilities were not willing to tread.6 To build an electric system 
which includes significant amounts of renewable energy will 
require comparable changes in our electricity system. Public 
policies currently being discussed can determine the success or 
failure of the renewable power industry. 
The electricity grid is a complex interconnected system 
requiring constant balancing of supply and demand.7 Using 
new intermittent technologies like solar and wind requires 
changes in grid management to maintain a constant energy 
balance in real-time. As more intermittent renewable 
resources have come onto the electricity grid, transmission 
operators have struggled to integrate the variability of these 
resources with existing conventional technologies. This 
comment analyzes proposed solutions for the integration of 
renewable variable energy resources (VER) into the electricity 
grid, and the legal and regulatory steps required to achieve 
this integration. 
                                                
5. See, e.g., James A. Holtkamp & Mark A. Davidson, Transmission Siting in the 
Western United States: Getting Green Electrons to Market, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 379 
(2010); see also Nunez, supra note 1. 
6. Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (2011); Rural Electrification Act of 
1936, 7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2011); see also Robert M. Greening, Jr., Bonneville Power 
Administration’s Preference Customers Meet the Northwest Power Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 
809, 823 (1983) (discussing the impact of public preference policies on bringing electric 
service to customers across the Pacific Northwest). 
7. Steven Ferrey, Restructuring A Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate 
New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 985-987 (2009); see also 
Andrew Howe, Dynamic Response Could Do Away with Costly Balancing Capacity, 
Utility Week, Sept. 24, 2008 available at http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/ 
news_story.asp?id=39227&title=Dynamic+demand+response+could+do+away+with+co
stly+balancing+capacity (discussing the challenges of balancing supply and demand 
within the energy grid). 
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Many ideas have been proposed for integrating renewable 
energy into the grid, and some have been implemented, but the 
policy debate continues. Most recently, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed a series of rules to 
level the playing field for renewable energy grid integration.8 
While FERC’s proposals are an improvement over the existing 
state of affairs, they do not go far enough to ensure the long-
term success of emerging renewable energy technologies. 
This comment begins with the assumption that the various 
renewable energy goals set out by the federal government and 
numerous states are essential for achieving a number of 
environmental, economic, national security, and climate 
change policy objectives. The changes required to integrate 
renewable energy into the grid will have costs associated with 
them. When assessing FERC’s Proposed Rule and other 
renewable integration policy proposals, this comment’s 
primary concern will be how the burdens of integration are 
distributed. Because growth in renewable energy is an 
essential part of so many policy goals, the costs of achieving 
those goals should be distributed equitably. Renewables should 
be allowed to compete on a level playing field rather than one 
designed to favor incumbent electricity generation 
technologies. 
To understand the motivation behind renewable energy 
development, Part II provides an overview of the problems 
renewable energy is meant to address and the policies 
encouraging its growth. Part III describes the obstacles faced 
by renewable energy resources when integrating with the 
existing electricity grid. Part IV outlines the general legal 
framework within which the problem of renewable integration 
must be resolved. Recent developments have focused attention 
on renewable integration and these events are discussed in 
Part V. Finally, Part VI offers a critique of the latest Proposed 
Rule on renewable integration from FERC. The article 
concludes that many elements of FERC’s proposal will address 
shortcomings in the current energy regulatory structure, but 
the Proposed Rule fails to take on many of the biggest issues 
facing renewables and the energy system as a whole. 
                                                
8. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,149 (Nov. 18, 2010) 
[hereinafter FERC Proposed Rule]. 
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II.  KEY DRIVERS BEHIND THE GROWTH OF 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 
A.  Policy Goals to be Achieved Through Growth in Renewable 
Energy 
Renewable technologies such as wind and solar account for 
an ever-increasing portion of our electric power production. 
From 2004 to 2008, the amount of electricity generated in the 
United States by wind and solar resources nearly quadrupled.9 
However, this renewable energy mix still makes up only a 
small percentage of overall U.S. electricity generation.10 Six 
policy goals have been outlined as the key drivers of the 
renewable energy growth over the past decade: 1) growth in 
energy demand; 2) climate change; 3) environmental benefits; 
4) energy costs; 5) economic revitalization and job creation; and 
6) energy security.11 
The demand for electricity in the United States is only 
expected to increase in the coming decades. Assuming 
electricity consumption continues to grow at current rates, 
rising demand will require almost 300 gigawatts of new 
electricity capacity in the United States by 2030.12 The impacts 
from growth in energy demand are not specific to the 
renewable energy sectors. Absent other factors, growth in 
energy demand will drive development across the spectrum of 
different types of generation technologies. Policies encouraging 
the growth in renewable energy create more ways to meet 
increasing energy needs. 
When discussing the need for renewable energy, most 
attention focuses on climate change. Most climate scientists 
                                                
9. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Renewable Energy Consumption for Electricity 
Generation by Energy Use Sector and Energy Source, 2004 – 2008 (August 2010) 
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/trends/table1_3.pdf  
(calculating the 2008 output of wind and solar energy for the electric sector (.555 
quadrillion Btu) divided by the 2004 output (.148) resulting in a ratio of 3.75). 
10. Press Release, U.S. Energy Info. Admin, Renewable Energy Consumption and 
Electricity Preliminary Statistics 2009 (Aug. 2010) available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/renew_energy_consump/rea_prereport.ht
ml (stating that renewable energy only made up 8% of overall us electricity 
consumption in 2009). 
11. Nunez, supra note 1, at 141. 
12. Worldwatch Institute, The Outlook on Renewable Energy in America  16 (2007) 
[hereinafter Worldwatch Report], available at http://www.acore.org/files/RECAP/docs/ 
OutlookonRenewableEnergy2007.pdf. 
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are in agreement that increasing levels of greenhouse gases 
are likely to trigger major climate effects including the 
disappearance of the Greenland ice cap or even a mass 
extinction.13 Further development of renewable energy 
technologies that generate little or no carbon represent an 
important path for mitigating the impact of climate change.14 
Closely related to climate change goals are other 
environmental benefits derived from renewable energy. 
Pollution from fossil fuel electricity generation causes smog, 
particulate pollution, acid precipitation and other air toxins.15 
The need for clean energy alternatives is greatest in populated 
urban areas where these pollution problems are most acute.16 
Clean technologies can replace power plants near population 
centers where they are most harmful to humans. 
Energy costs have become another significant concern of 
policy makers. With international energy demand only 
expected to increase, upward pressure on fossil fuel prices will 
likely continue.17 Constraints have hit individual consumers in 
tangible ways as prices for gasoline and heating oil have seen 
intense volatility over the past five years.18 This has translated 
into significant new investment in the renewable energy sector 
in search of fuels that are insulated from the volatility of 
global commodity markets.19 
Large-scale renewable generation has the potential to 
                                                
13. Anthony D. Barnosky, Has the Earth’s Sixth Mass Extinction Already Arrived?,  
471 NATURE 51-57, Mar. 3, 2011; see also Robert H. Socolow & Stephen W. Pacala, A 
Plan to Keep Carbon in Check, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 2006, at 50; see also 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical 
Science Basics-Summary for Policy Makers (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. 
14. Daniel M. Kammen, The Rise of Renewable Energy, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 
2006 at 85. 
15. Karl R. Rabago, A Strategy for Developing Stationary Biodiesel Generation, 36 
CUMB. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (2006). 
16. Id. 
17. See generally U.S. Energy Info. Admin, World Energy Demand and Economic 
Outlook 2010 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html. 
18. Jad Mouawad, Swings in Price of Oil Hobble Forecasting, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/business/ 
06oil.html?_r=1&hp; See also Floyd Norris, Off the Charts: Weathering Gas Price 
Volatility, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
03/10/business/worldbusiness/10iht-wbmarket11.html?scp=1&sq=natural%20gas 
%20price%20volatility&st=Search. 
19. UNEP Report, supra note 2, at 11. 
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reinvigorate struggling economies across the U.S.20 Most wind 
and solar farms are located in remote rural portions of the 
United States. Increased demand for renewable energy will 
multiply the number of these farms, which will increase jobs 
and create value for this rural land. The significance of this 
potential reinvigoration of rural economies is magnified by 
findings that renewable energy development creates more jobs 
per megawatt than fossil fuel energy technologies.21 This 
increased economic activity also increases the tax base for local 
governments at a time when many are in desperate need of 
new revenue.22 
Finally, renewable energy policies are driven by the goal of a 
more secure energy supply for the United States. Energy 
security has been defined as “having energy services when 
they are needed, under acceptable terms and conditions, and 
without fear of unexpected interruption.”23 Of great concern is 
America’s dependence on foreign oil, which ties us to unstable 
and undemocratic nations around the world.24 Renewables can 
address this problem by providing energy to power electric 
transportation with no fuel costs subject to the fluctuations of 
international markets. These policy goals have stimulated 
significant governmental action to encourage renewable energy 
development with varying degrees of success. 
B.  Government Programs Encourage Renewable Energy 
Over the past decade the renewable energy sector has been 
                                                
20. Nunez, supra note 1, at 143-144. 
21. See generally Daniel Kammen, Kamal Kapadia, & Matthias Fripp, Putting 
Renewables to Work: How Many Jobs Can the Clean Energy Industry Create?, UC 
BERKELEY: RENEWABLE AND APPROPRIATE ENERGY LABORATORY (RAEL), April 2004 
(updated January 2006), available at http://rael.berkeley.edu/files/2004/Kammen-
Renewable-Jobs-2004.pdf; see also Peter Meisen & Trevor Erberich, Renewable Energy 
on Tribal Lands, Global Energy Network Institute 27-28, available at 
http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-on-tribal-
lands/Renewable-Energy-on-Tribal-Lands.pdf (explaining the obstacles and potential 
benefits of renewable energy development on tribal lands in the U.S.). 
22. Verne G. Kopytoff, Amazon Pressured on Sales Tax, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2011, 
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/technology/14amazon.html 
?_r=1&scp=1&sq=state%20government%20revenue&st=cse (explaining that across the 
country state officials are struggling with budget shortfalls and looking for new 
sources of revenue). 
23. Rabago, supra note 15, at 464. 
24. Worldwatch Report, supra note 12, at 8. 
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the beneficiary of countless development programs.25 The 
policies with the greatest impact fall in two categories: federal 
tax incentives and state renewable portfolio standards. 
Originally, the primary federal tax incentive for large wind 
energy projects had been a production tax credit.26 Wind 
developers received a tax credit of 2.2 cents per kilowatt hour 
of energy produced.27 Alternatively, solar technologies were 
eligible for an investment tax credit worth 30% of project 
expenditures.28 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(Stimulus) substantially modified the tax incentives adding 
additional options for developers of large renewable energy 
projects.29 The Stimulus gives developers of wind and solar the 
choice of using an investment tax credit or a production tax 
credit.30 In addition, the Stimulus authorized the Treasury to 
issue cash grants in lieu of the tax credits.31 The various 
choices allow each project developer to elect the incentive that 
best suits the specific circumstances of their project.32 
To supplement the federal incentives, 29 states have 
adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPS).33 Generally, an 
                                                
25. See, e.g., Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter DSIRE]. DSIRE is a 
comprehensive database compiling all state and federal incentive programs relating to 
clean energy and energy efficiency administered by North Carolina State University in 
cooperation with federal energy agencies. 
26. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2011). 
27. Internal Revenue Serv., Form 8835 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/f8835.pdf; see also DSIRE, Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_ 
Code=US13F&re=1&ee=1. 
28. 26 U.S.C. § 48; see also DSIRE, Business Energy Investment Tax Credit, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US02F (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2011). 
29. 26 U.S.C. §§ 45, 48 (2011). 
30. Id. 
31. See Id. § 48(d). 
32. See generally Mark Bolinger, Ryan Wiser, Karlynn Cory, & Ted James, PTC, 
ITC, or Cash Grant? An Analysis of the Choices Facing Power Projects in the United 
States, ERNESTO ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY (2009), 
available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP/reports/lbnl-1642e.pdf  (discussing the 
considerations in choosing which incentive structure to elect for renewable energy 
developers). 
33. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 et seq. (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285 
(2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 469A; NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.7801 et seq. (2011); ARIZ. ADMIN. 
CODE § R14-2-1801 et seq. (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2001 et seq. (2011); COL. 
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RPS requires utility generation portfolios to be composed of a 
specified minimum amount of clean energy generation. States 
have different eligibility requirements and many allow non-
renewable technologies such as advanced coal and nuclear 
generation to account for energy goals.34 However, wind and 
solar energy have benefitted greatly from these state policies. 
For example, Texas has installed more than 9,000 MW of wind 
capacity since the state RPS was amended in 2005.35 Likewise, 
in the second half of 2010 the California Energy Commission 
licensed over 4,100 MW of large-scale solar power, which will 
be used to meet the state’s Renewables Portfolio Standard.36 
These primary policies are supplemented by a host of 
constantly changing federal and state programs that are 
designed to achieve the various policy goals served by growth 
in renewable energy.37 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE OBSTACLES 
A.  Renewables Impact the Ability of Regulated Entities to 
Meet Reliability Requirements 
The characteristics of energy output from renewable 
resources are fundamentally different from the traditional 
technologies that energy system operators are accustomed to. 
Wind and solar energy are classified as VERs because the 
availability of the fuel source is not as predictable as 
conventional thermal power plants.38 FERC has proposed to 
                                                
REV. STAT. § 40-2-124 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-15-34, 62-16-4 (2011); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 66-1256 et seq. (2011); TEXAS UTILITIES CODE § 39.904; See generally DSIRE, 
supra note 25. 
34. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64 et seq. (West 2011) (including clean 
coal, coal bed methane, and advanced nuclear as technologies eligible to meet the Ohio 
Alternative Energy Resource Standard). 
35. Wind Powering America, Installed Wind Capacity by State, 1999-2009, available 
at http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/docs/installed_wind_capacity_by_state.xls 
(last updated Feb. 4, 2010). 
36. Press Release, California Energy Commission, CA Energy Commission Approves 
650 MW of Solar Power in California Desert (December 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/releases/2010_releases/2010-12-15_Approval_palen+rice_ 
NR.html. 
37. See DSIRE, supra note 25 (providing a comprehensive collection of renewable 
energy policies). 
38. See NERC, Special Report: Accommodating High Levels of Variable Generation 
40 (2009) [hereinafter NERC Report], available at http://www.nerc.com/files/IVGTF_ 
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define a VER as, “. . .a device for the production of electricity 
that is characterized by an energy source that: (1) is 
renewable; (2) cannot be stored by the facility owner or 
operator; and (3) has variability that is beyond the control of 
the facility owner or operator.”39 Because the energy from 
these plants generally cannot be dispatched unless the wind is 
blowing or the sun is shining, utilities have a more difficult 
task when conducting resource planning to meet regulatory 
requirements.40 
To maintain a reliable electricity grid, FERC adopted a rule 
incorporating into federal regulation the reliability standards 
from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC).41 NERC is a self-regulating organization striving for a 
reliable power system through development and enforcement 
of system reliability standards and assessment of resource 
adequacy. 42 NERC is also subject to oversight from FERC.43 
NERC enforces these reliability standards upon balancing 
authorities (BAs). BAs are the entities responsible for 
providing the minute-to-minute reliable operation of the power 
system by continuously matching the supply of electricity with 
the demand and ensuring sufficient supply capacity for future 
hours.44 These reliability requirements are generally applied 
within defined balancing authority areas of various sizes.45 
Within a given balancing authority area there may be other 
system operators such as transmission operators or generators 
that are also responsible for controlling elements of the electric 
system.46 Transmission operators, and often electric utility 
                                                
Report_041609.pdf. 
39. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 64. 
40. See NERC Report, supra note 38, at 2. 
41. See Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk Power System, 18 C.F.R. § 
40.1–40.3 (2011); see also Report of the Electricity Regulation Committee, 28 ENERGY 
L.J. 267, 304–05 (2007). 
42. See NERC Report, supra note 38, at 2. 
43. Id. 
44. NERC, Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards (February 12, 2008), 
http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_12Feb08.pdf. 
45. Id, see also W. Elec. Coordinating Council, Western Interconnection Balancing 
Authorities (2009), available at http://www.wecc.biz/library/WECC%20Documents/ 
Publications/Balancing%20Authorities.pdf (providing a map illustrating the variability 
in size of different balancing authorities). 
46. David J. Hurlbut, Multistate Decision Making for Renewable Energy and 
Transmission: An Overview, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 677, 685-86 (2010) (explaining that a 
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companies, may need to take steps in the management of their 
resources to maintain the reliability requirements across the 
BA.47 Generators, as will be discussed later, may be required to 
purchase other services to maintain reliability.48 Ultimately, 
though, the BA is responsible for managing all of the energy 
flow within its area to meet NERC reliability requirements.49 
It is important to keep in mind that reliability requirements 
are not the only factor dictating the cost of integrating 
renewables. NERC reliability requirements are placed upon an 
entire BA, not upon any single generator.50 How the BA and its 
constituent entities meet these requirements has a significant 
impact on the overall cost of integration. FERC regulations 
outline a general tariff structure allowing transmission 
providers to recover reliability costs from generators, which 
can also have a significant impact on integration costs.51 
The danger comes when reliability is achieved through 
adjustments to the system as a whole but the accounting for 
those costs is allocated individually to each generating unit. 
Allocating a standard transmission tariff for variable energy 
resources creates a direct linear relationship between the 
amount of VERs on the system and the tariffs charged to those 
resources. However, the cost of balancing VERs does not 
increase in a linear scale.52 As additional VERs are brought 
onto the system, the relative impact of each additional unit 
decreases because the variability between VERs will naturally 
                                                
BA is made up of the “generation, transmission, and loads within its metered 
boundaries). 
47. See W. Elec. Coordinating Council, supra note 45 (listing numerous electric 
utilities which act as BAs including Puget Sound Energy, Bonneville Power 
Administration, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power). 
48. See infra at Part IV.B (discussing ancillary services which generators may be 
required to pay). 
49. Hurlbut, supra note 46. 
50. See generally NERC, Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric System of N. 
Am.,  Standard BAL-001-0.1a  et seq.  (2008) available at http://www.nerc.com/ 
files/Reliability_Standards_Complete_Set.pdf (applying Real Power Balancing Control 
Performance Standard to balancing authorities). 
51. See infra at Part IV.B (discussing FERC open access transmission tariffs). 
52. See Brendan Kirby, Michael Milligan & Yih-huei Wan, Nat’l Renewable Energy 
Lab., Cost-Causation-Based Tariffs for Wind Ancillary Service Impacts 2 (June 2006), 
available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/engineering_science_technology/cooling_heating_ 
power/pdf/WindPower_2006_Tariff.pdf (finding that linear scaling of wind data can 
significantly over estimate wind impacts). 
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cancel out.53 What this means is that more wind on a system 
make it more likely that low winds at one wind farm will be 
cancelled out by gusts at another wind farm. With only two 
wind farms the likelihood of this kind of balance is low, but 
with 20 wind farms balancing among the wind resources 
becomes more likely. 
For BAs and other entities responsible for meeting 
reliability requirements, the added variability from renewables 
impacts both how the grid is managed and how to account for 
the cost of that management. 
B.  The Electricity System Has Not Been Designed to 
Incorporate Renewables 
Our current electricity system operators are accustomed to 
managing power systems composed of more predictable 
resources to meet variable customer demand but with little 
experience handling variable electricity generation. To fully 
comprehend the context of the changes beginning to happen in 
the electricity system it is helpful to understand the current 
state of the electricity system. The vast majority of electricity 
in the United States comes from nuclear, hydroelectric and 
fossil fuel resources.54 These conventional electricity sources 
have very predictable operating performance and well 
understood characteristics. Perhaps most importantly, utilities 
have incorporated each of these technologies into their short-
term and long-term planning processes.55 
The electric utilities were created in an age of mostly self-
sufficient, vertically integrated electric utilities, which owned 
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities.56 Service 
                                                
53. See id. at 9 (“Aggregating wind plant variability with aggregate system load 
further reduces the amount of regulating reserves that are required to balance the 
power system and maintain reliability”). 
54. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 
2009, DOE/EIA-0348 Figure ES 1 at 2 (Revised January 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf. 
55. See NERC, supra note 38, at 3 (noting that under the NERC reliability 
standards utilities must engage in both long-term and short-term energy planning to 
meet the electricity demands of customers on their systems). 
56. See Recovery of Stranded Costs by Pub. Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 
Fed. Reg. 21,540 at 21,543 (codified at 18 CFR §§ 35 and 385) [hereinafter Order No. 
888], available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp? 
Doc=8274712:0. 
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from these facilities was bundled and sold to wholesale and 
retail customers.57 Electric utilities built their own generation 
facilities and transmission systems. Many relied heavily on 
large coal, hydroelectric, or nuclear generating stations.58 Each 
system covered limited service areas and was designed to serve 
its own load independent of supply and demand from other 
service areas.59 This structure of separate systems arose 
naturally due primarily to the cost and technological 
limitations on the distance over which electricity could be 
transmitted.60 
For electricity systems built upon this traditional model, the 
majority of the system variability comes from the demand for 
energy. While utilities can forecast electricity demand, these 
forecasts are not exact. When a customer decides to turn on 
the light in her house, no one needs to call the local utility to 
tell them they are going to need a little more power. However, 
system operators know with a high degree of certainty that a 
nuclear plant will be running 24 hours a day.61 This steady and 
consistent power supply is known as baseload power.62 
Likewise, if a natural gas plant is scheduled to come on to 
serve peak electricity demand system operators can expect 
that power plant to deliver the needed power.63 These peaking 
power plants are cycled on and off to follow the changing 
demands of the energy system throughout the day and the 
seasons. Because of their ability to quickly cycle on and off, 
these peaking plants also serve a critical backup role if another 
energy resource is not available. These two types of plants, 
baseload and peaking, have represented the two primary 
categories for our electricity supply.64 
Introducing significant amounts of variable resources to the 
system places uncertainty on both the supply and demand 
sides of the energy equation. For BAs and other entities which 
                                                
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. See James F. Wilson, Restructuring the Electric Power Industry: Past Problems, 
Future Directions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 232, 235 (2002) (distinguishing 
baseload and peaking power). 
62. See id. 
63. See id. 
64. See Ferrey, supra note 7, at 987. 
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must continuously match the supply and demand, this added 
variability and unpredictability makes the job more difficult.65 
First, there must be enough energy available in the case that 
wind and solar resources are not available at any given 
moment. Second, sufficient energy must also be available to 
meet future demands and ultimately ensure compliance with 
NERC’s reliability standards.66 
C. Where Renewables Fit Into the Energy Supply 
Given the variability of energy supply from renewables, 
where do resources like solar and wind fit into the historical 
categories of baseload and peaking power? Renewable VERs 
are unable to be classified as baseload because they 
demonstrate relatively low availability factors.67 However, due 
to the same unpredictable availability, variable renewable 
resources also cannot be relied upon to fill in as peaking power 
resources. As a result VERs are currently taken whenever they 
are available, similar to a baseload power plant, while 
decreasing the reliability of the overall baseload energy supply. 
Operating VERs whenever they are available makes 
economic sense because the resources have extremely low 
marginal cost for production. In this sense, VERs share some 
characteristics with other baseload resources which have low 
marginal cost for energy production. 68  Wind and solar plants 
can have significant capital costs; however, once a wind plant 
enters operation there are no fuel costs and relatively low 
operations costs.69 Thus the more energy the plant generates, 
the lower the overall cost of the energy it produces. This has 
significant implications for system operators who prioritize 
dispatch of energy according to marginal cost with the 
cheapest resources coming first.70 The result is renewable 
                                                
65. See NERC Report, supra note 38, at 3. 
66. See id. 
67. See Steven Ferrey, The Law of Independent Power § 2:11 (25th ed. 2009); see also 
RENEWABLE ENERGY RESEARCH LAB, UNIV. OF MASS. AT AMHERST, WIND POWER: 
CAPACITY FACTOR, INTERMITTENCY, AND WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE WIND DOESN’T 
BLOW? (2004), available at http://www.ceere.org/rerl/about_wind/RERL_Fact_ 
Sheet_2a_Capacity_Factor.pdf (stating that typical wind power capacity is 20-40%, 
hydro power capacity is 30-80%, and solar power capacity is 12-15%). 
68. See Ferrey, supra note 7, at 987. 
69. See id. at 987. 
70. See id. at 987-988. 
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energy units that will always be utilized when available, 
taking precedence over all other resources including large 
baseload plants.71 
This represents a radical shift in management of baseload 
resources. To achieve the lowest marginal cost, most 
traditional coal and nuclear power plants are designed to run 
constantly at peak efficiency.72 If taken offline to accommodate 
renewables, these conventional power plants require 
significant time to restart and cannot be quickly brought back 
into operation.73 Put more simply, these plants are designed to 
serve the around-the-clock demands of the energy system. If 
forced to cycle on and off, these plants no longer serve their 
designed purpose and will run less efficiently.74 This decreased 
efficiency translates to increases in the cost of the electricity 
produced as well as the pollution created per unit of energy. 
Increasing renewable energy has three major implications 
for the cost of electricity. First, running old base load plants 
below peak efficiency means that utilities and ultimately 
ratepayers will pay more for the energy they purchase from 
these plants.75 Second, because these base load plants may be 
forced to occasionally shut down due to renewable availability, 
the traditional base load generators will be selling less power 
overall. Finally, the decreases in system resource availability 
and reliability will increase the demand for backup power 
resources to compensate for the base load fluctuations caused 
by variable renewable resources.76 These costs make up what 
have generally been characterized as renewable integration 
costs.77 Complaints from BAs currently managing these costs 
                                                
71. See id. at 988. 
72. See Ferrey, supra note 61, at §10.37 (noting the difficulty in quickly starting 
conventional power plants); see also Steven Lefton & Phil Presuner, The Cost of 
Cycling Coal Fired Power Plants, COAL POWER MAG., Winter 2006, at 16, 20, available 
at http://www.aptecheng.com/corporate/CurrentEvents/100_CoalPowerWinterMag16-
20.pdf. 
73. See Ferrey, supra note 67, at 988. 
74. Id. 
75. See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN WIND AND 
SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY 315-316 (2010) [hereinafter NREL INTEGRATION STUDY], 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2010/wwsis_ 
final_report.pdf. 
76. See Ferrey, supra note 7, at 990. 
77. See, e.g., Mark Bolinger & Ryan Wiser, Balancing Cost and Risk: The Treatment 
of Renewable Energy in Western Utility Resource Plans 1 (2005), available at 
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have generated significant debate about the future of 
renewable energy on the electricity grid.78 
D. The Cost of Renewable Success 
Experts predict wind and solar will make up anywhere from 
eleven percent to thirty-five percent of the energy supply for 
the Western United States by 2025, representing a substantial 
increase from current levels.79 The result of successes in the 
expansion of VERs will be a corresponding increase in the need 
for new quick-starting peaking power plants that can provide 
the backup power for the renewables.80 More VERs will mean 
increased integration costs. Just how significant these costs 
will be is a subject of vigorous debate. Both NERC and the 
National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) have commissioned 
studies to investigate the issue.81 
The NREL study found that under most scenarios a high 
penetration of wind and solar would actually decrease the 
system operating costs across the Western U.S.82 However, one 
scenario requiring more significant curtailment of coal plant 
operation did show a significant increase in annual operating 
costs.83 Moreover, assumptions in the NREL study could be 
viewed as artificially inflating the cost of fossil fuel energy. 
Most notably the study assumes a cost of $30 per metric ton of 
CO2 presumably resulting from passage of federal climate 
change legislation.84 This is a dubious assumption, considering 
passage of comprehensive climate regulation appears remote 
                                                
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/37p4j85p; see also Avista Corp., Wind Integration Study 
at x (2007), available at http://www.uwig.org/AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf 
(defining integration cost as “. . . the reduction in value of wind energy due to its 
variability and uncertainty.”). 
78. See, e.g., Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128 
(August 13, 2010) [hereinafter Puget Rejection]. 
79. See NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75, at 116-117 and ES-2. 
80. See Ferrey, supra note 57, at 994. 
81. See, e.g., NERC, supra note 38, at 3; NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75; 
and NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, DEP’T OF ENERGY, EASTERN WIND INTEGRATION 
STUDY (2010), available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2010/ 
ewits_final_report.pdf. 
82. See NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75, at ES-14–ES-28 (finding that the 
highest savings reported in the 30% renewable penetration case resulted in a 40% 
system operations savings across the WECC service territory). 
83. Id. at ES-28. 
84. See id. at ES-3. 
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outside of California, the Northeast, and some cities which 
have already adopted such measures.85 Ultimately NREL 
acknowledges that its study does not take into account the 
costs “. . .that would be required to implement the operational 
reforms needed to accommodate the renewables[.]”86 While the 
reduced cost projections are a good motivator for achieving a 
higher level of renewables on our grid, ultimately the report 
does not take on the difficult task of estimating the cost of 
implementing its recommended changes. 
The NERC study goes even further to avoid predicting the 
ultimate cost for achieving a fully integrated grid.87 However, 
NERC shares NREL’s conclusion that a functional integrated 
grid is achievable, finding that “[t]his proposed level of 
commitment to renewable variable generation offers many 
benefits such as new energy resources, fuel diversification, and 
greenhouse gas and particulates reductions.”88 
Determining these costs is a key first step in the process of 
renewables integration. Once the costs are determined, 
perhaps an even more divisive step must be taken when 
payment of the integration costs is allocated throughout the 
energy system. Within the energy system costs are felt by 
generators, utility companies and ratepayers. While law and 
policy can have some role in determining what the costs are, 
they play a much larger role in the allocation of those costs. 
IV. LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Given the complex legal and regulatory landscape for 
electricity, it is helpful to have some understanding of the laws 
underpinning the regulation of electricity in the US and how 
these laws interact with the integration of renewable energy. 
                                                
85. See id. at ES-3; see also Editorial, At Least Some Politicians Get It, N. Y. TIMES, 
January 10, 2011, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/opinion/ 
10mon3.html?ref=climateandenergylegislation (discussing the inability of Congress to 
pass climate legislation and the patchwork of climate programs that have been passed 
in some cities and states across the country). 
86. NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75, at ES-14. 
87. See NERC, supra note 38, at 3 (“. . . NERC does not advocate a particular 
resource mix, weight cost allocation approaches or recommend specific technology 
solutions to address identified reliability concerns.”). 
88. Id. at 63. 
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A. Federal Power Act and Amendments 
Originally passed in 1920 to regulate and coordinate the 
development of hydroelectric projects across the United States, 
the Federal Power Act (FPA) has expanded in scope to regulate 
transmission and wholesale purchases of electricity in 
interstate commerce.89 The FPA created the Federal Power 
Commission (later reorganized as FERC) to enforce the FPA.90 
Of particular significance for renewable VER integration is 
section 205(a) requiring “[a]ll rates and charges made, 
demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection 
with the transmission or sale of electric energy. . .shall be just 
and reasonable.”91 This provision has laid the foundation for 
many key regulations and cases which provide the current 
structure for the pricing of electricity including renewables.92 
This passage was made all the more significant by the passage 
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (1992 Act) which mandated 
non-discriminatory open access to transmission.93 This change 
represented a fundamental shift in the structure of the 
electricity market from utility-dominated generation 
monopolies to more competitive markets for independent 
electricity generators.94 
B. New Laws and Regulations Begin to Open the Market 
Passage of the 1992 Act empowered FERC to have a greater 
involvement in utility ratemaking.95 One potential method for 
discriminating against market participants was through 
pricing for transmission, which is often owned by utility 
companies. FERC’s new authority allowed the Commission to 
regulate transmission rates to ensure all market participants 
                                                
89. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824 et seq. (2011); see also 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 
3 (2011). 
90. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2011); see also 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 6. 
91. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2011). 
92. See generally Patrick J. McCormick III & Sean B. Cunningham, The 
Requirements of the “Just and Reasonable” Standard: Legal Bases for Reform of 
Electric Transmission Rates, 21 ENERGY L.J. 389 (2000). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a) (2011). 
94. Susan Kelly & Elise Caplan, Time For a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to Reform 
RTO-Run Centralized Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491, 492 (2008). 
95. 16 U.S.C. § 824k (2011) (giving FERC authority to regulate electric transmission 
rates). 
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had equal market access. As part of this move to a more open 
market, FERC indicated its willingness to allow utilities to 
recover “opportunity costs” in addition to their standard rate 
even before the 1992 Act was passed.96 FERC explained that 
opportunity costs, “are incurred by a utility when the utility 
accommodates a third party’s request for transmission service. 
. .and thereby foregoes an opportunity to reduce its own costs, 
to the economic detriment of the utility’s native load 
customers.”97 In other words, generators who increased costs 
for their transmission provider could be required to pay for 
those costs. These opportunity costs opened the door for what 
has become the current debate regarding integration costs. 
FERC cases addressing opportunity costs necessarily 
implicate the just and reasonable rate standard of the FPA. 
Courts have generally upheld FERC’s rulings deferring to the 
Commission’s judgment. One of the first cases to address the 
just and reasonable standard in relation to opportunity costs 
was Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. FERC.98 In that case the D.C. 
Circuit was willing to defer to FERC’s technical ratemaking 
expertise so long as it supplies “sufficient reasoning backed up 
by substantial evidence.”99 The court further noted the 
obligation for just and reasonable rates runs on both sides of 
the meter to both electricity customers and independent power 
producers such as renewable generators.100 Even though the 
price of an energy contract was the product of bilateral 
negotiations between the utility and the generator, FERC 
determined that the opportunity cost was not just and 
reasonable for ratepayers who had not participated in the 
negotiation.101 
                                                
96. Pa. Elec. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 11 F.3d 207, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding FERC’s 
approval of additional service charges for the provision of electric transmission 
service). 
97. Pa. Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,871 (1992); see also Re Public Service Co. of New 
Hampshire, 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,070 (1992); and Northeast Utilities Service Co., 58 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,069 (1992). 
98. Pa. Elec. Co., supra at note 96. 
99. Id. at 211. 
100. Id. at 209-10 (explaining that, “ FERC’s responsibility…is to ensure just and 
reasonable rates for native load customers and for third parties” such as generators or 
other utility companies); See also Ferrey, supra note 67, § 8:9. 
101. See Pa. Elec. Co., supra note 96, at 209-10 (explaining, “ FERC’s 
responsibility…is to ensure just and reasonable rates for native load customers and for 
third parties. Whether a rate satisfies this requirement is to be determined by FERC, 
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FERC formalized its rulings on opportunity costs with 
promulgation of Order No. 888 requiring public utilities 
transmitting electricity to have non-discriminatory open access 
transmission tariffs (OATT).102 However, the order also 
permits public utilities to seek recovery of legitimate and 
verifiable “stranded costs” associated with providing open 
access.103 These stranded costs closely resemble the description 
of “opportunity costs” FERC had discussed in its decisions just 
a few years earlier.104 Ultimately Order No. 888 and the ability 
for utilities to recover the costs of complying with new laws 
and regulations represents the first step in a series of legal and 
regulatory changes which lowered barriers and made more 
room for competition in the electricity industry. 
One of the significant products of stranded costs was the 
creation of several categories of “ancillary services” 
transmission providers charge to their customers to implement 
the open access reforms.105 Three categories of ancillary 
services are of particular importance to renewable generators: 
imbalance service, spinning reserve service, and operating 
reserve service. Imbalance service “makes up for any net 
mismatch over an hour between the scheduled delivery of 
energy and the actual load that the energy serves in the 
control area.”106 Imbalance service allows utilities to charge 
renewables generators for not meeting their scheduled 
obligations for delivered energy and has long been argued as 
discriminatory against intermittent renewable energy 
resources.107 
Spinning reserve and supplemental reserve services 
(characterized generally as operating reserve) provide, “extra 
                                                
not the parties to an agreement, however voluntary their agreement may be.”). 
102. Order No. 888, supra note 56, at 21540. 
103. Id. at 21541. 
104. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26 (2011) (generally stranded costs may be recovered through 
retail rates by utilities for any costs incurred providing required services to 
customers). 
105. Order No. 888, supra note 56, at 21579–21590. 
106. Id. at 21582. 
107. See, e.g., Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission 
Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 12266, Summary (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 
35, 37) [hereinafter Order No. 890], available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-
meet/2007/021507/E-1.pdf; see also National Wind Coordinating Collaborative, FERC 
Order 890: What Does it Mean for the West?, available at http://www.nationalwind.org/ 
assets/publications/ferc890.pdf. 
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generation available to serve load in case there is an 
unplanned event such as loss of generation.”108 Each 
transmission region has specific required reserve amounts 
based upon system characteristics in that region.109 This 
service can then be imposed upon specific generators such as 
VERs which require higher levels of operating reserve.110 
Order No. 888 had the positive effect of opening an 
electricity market that had been closely controlled by the 
transmission owners, most often electric utilities. Independent 
renewable energy generators have been a primary beneficiary 
of this market opening. In opening the door, though, 
renewables generators saw still more obstacles on the other 
side in the form of stranded costs and ancillary services they 
would be required to buy. 
C. Policies Designed Specifically for Renewable Energy 
As a result of federal and state policies supporting 
renewable energy, development of those resources continued to 
increase.111 FERC reacted by initiating a proceeding which 
would result in the approval of Order No. 890 to limit 
discrimination against transmission customers and “increase 
transparency in the rules applicable to planning and use of the 
transmission system.”112 The order’s intent was partly to 
benefit renewable resources through more equitable 
transmission access and pricing.113 
One of the most significant changes the order made for the 
growth of renewable energy was the creation of a “conditional 
firm” and “hourly firm” transmission service.114 Conditional 
firm service allows a transmission provider to guarantee a 
generator access to transmission with the condition that the 
transmission provider can curtail that generator under certain 
                                                
108. Order No. 888, supra note 56, at 21582–21583. 
109. Id. 
110. See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, WECC Standard 
Operating Reserves, BAL-STD-002-0 (2007), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/ 
BAL-STD-002-0.pdf. 
111. See supra at 6. 
112. Order No. 890, supra note 107, at Summary. 
113. Id. ¶ 78 (noting that measures undertaken in the order “can be particularly 
beneficial to renewable generation resources”). 
114. Id. ¶ 73, 925, 1177. 
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grid conditions or for a certain defined number of hours during 
the year.115 Hourly firm service allows transmission customers 
to request firm transmission service on shorter notice the day 
before the service is to commence.116 
Conditional firm service addressed a problem that prior 
rules created for wind generators; previously, FERC tariffs 
allowed transmission operators to reject transmission 
contracts with generators if the transmission would not be 
available for even a single hour of the contract period.117 
Without long-term transmission rights, renewable generators 
could not procure financing for construction. Prior to 
conditional firm contracts, transmission operators had only 
been able to enter into two kinds of contracts: firm service and 
non-firm service. Firm service provides almost unconditional 
access to transmission usually under a long-term contract.118 
Non-firm service is reserved and scheduled as-available, can be 
interrupted under specific conditions, and cannot be contracted 
for longer than one year.119 
Variable renewable resources did not easily fit into either of 
these categories. Purchasing firm service would inherently 
underutilize the transmission capacity. Specific terms for 
delivered energy could never be met for resources which 
cannot be scheduled with precision.120 At the same time, under 
a firm contract, the transmission operator would be required to 
hold open transmission capacity for renewables in the case the 
energy was available as scheduled. As a result, a renewable 
generator entering a firm contract would be paying for more 
transmission access than would ever be used by the renewable 
project. The transmission operator, on the other hand, would 
underutilize transmission assets which could not be scheduled 
under the terms of the contract even if there was no power 
coming from the renewable project. Renewable generators also 
could not rely solely on non-firm service because year-to-year 
contracts create too much uncertainty for potential investors. 
                                                
115. Id. ¶ 925. 
116. Id. ¶ 1178. 
117. Id. ¶ 86. The transmission service provider would thus be required to reserve 
transmission capacity for a renewable project that, because of its intermittent nature, 
would never fully utilize the purchased transmission capacity. 
118. Nunez, supra note 1, at 169. 
119. Id. 
120. See Ferrey, supra note 67, § 2:11. 
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Conditional firm service solves these problems by allowing 
transmission operators to offer long-term contracts while 
retaining the right to interrupt transmission access under 
certain limited conditions. Essentially, these terms give 
transmission operators the ability to limit transmission access 
to the generator until congestion can be relieved and firm 
transmission can be offered. 
In addition, Order No. 890 opened the door for hourly-firm 
service which offers a more attractive alternative to the old 
non-firm service.121 While FERC did not require transmission 
owners to offer hourly-firm service, the Commission made it 
clear that such a service was permissible.122 Hourly-firm 
service guarantees transmission access in hourly increments 
and can be scheduled as late as 10:00 a.m. the day before the 
service is to commence.123 This creates a more reliable spot 
market for renewable generators to sell into when compared 
against/with as-available non-firm service. Because the 
availability of variable renewable resources is difficult to 
determine far in advance, hourly firm service gives renewable 
generators incentive to improve forecasting in order to 
accurately predict energy output for sale into the hourly firm 
market. 
Taken together, conditional firm and hourly firm 
transmission services represent a significant improvement on 
the electricity market structure for variable renewable 
resources. Conditional firm service gives renewable generators 
long-term transmission contracts required to finance projects. 
Hourly firm service encourages renewable generators to 
improve forecasting and allows them to sell into a reliable spot 
market when their resource availability does not match their 
scheduled transmission access under a conditional-firm 
contract. While conditional-firm service provides a foundation 
to finance new projects, hourly firm service allows renewable 
generators to maximize the sale of all electricity as it becomes 
available. 
Order No. 890 also tried to rectify the harm caused by the 
                                                
121. Order No. 890, supra note 107, ¶ 1212-1213. 
122. See Id. at 1213 (explaining that “transmission operators will continue to have 
the option to propose offering hourly firm service in an FPA section 205 filing with the 
Commission”). 
123. See, e.g., Id at 1178 (explaining FERCs proposal for required hourly firm 
service). 
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“discriminatory pricing” of imbalance service.124 Previous 
regulations under Order No. 888 had given wide discretion to 
transmission entities in determining the rates charged for 
imbalance penalties and was thus subject to abuse.125 To 
address the situation, FERC adopted a tiered structure for 
imbalance services and exempted intermittent resources, 
including renewables, from the highest tier. In addition, FERC 
tied the cost of the imbalance service to the incremental cost of 
energy for a given transmission system.126 
While these specific regulatory actions to encourage 
renewable energy have helped increase growth in the sector, 
both renewable generators and transmission providers have 
continued to battle over the costs renewables place on the 
system and how to allocate those costs. 
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DEBATE OVER 
RENEWABLE INTEGRATION 
In the past year the intensity has increased in the debate 
over renewable energy integration. Recent events have focused 
the attention of utilities, system operators, and generators of 
renewable and traditional energy technologies. In August, 
FERC rejected a proposal by Puget Sound Energy (Puget) to 
modify its OATT to create a wind integration service.127 This 
proposal followed several similar efforts by other utilities 
across the U.S. Shortly afterward, FERC issued notice of a 
proposed rulemaking to reform the OATT by modifying 
ancillary service rules as well as offering intra-hour 
transmission scheduling. This section offers an overview of the 
utility proposals and suggests the implications these proposals 
may have on FERC’s Proposed Rule. 
A. Puget Sound Energy Tariff Proposal 
In August 2010, a proposal from Puget to modify its OATT 
                                                
124. Id. ¶ 70. 
125. Id. 
126. Id.; see also S. Cal. Water Co. v. F.E.R.C., 433 F.3d 840, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(ruling on a contract dispute in which the contract defined incremental cost as, 
“expense incurred…in providing an additional increment of energy or capacity”). 
127. Puget Rejection, supra note 78. 
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to include a “Wind Following Service” was rejected by FERC.128 
The proposal would have allowed Puget to recover the costs 
associated with following and balancing the within-hour 
variations in output from wind generation.129 All wind 
resources within Puget’s balancing authority would be 
required to purchase the Wind Following Service or enter into 
a contractual arrangement with a third party to provide the 
service, or self-supply the service.130 
Puget argued that under its current transmission tariff 
structure it cannot afford to add additional wind resources 
while maintaining compliance with NERC reliability 
standards.131 Puget currently has sufficient hydroelectric and 
natural gas resources to balance the existing wind on its 
system. In the future, Puget argues, additional wind resources 
will require the utility to seek out new following and balancing 
resources to support the new wind. Puget characterizes the 
cost of procuring these new resources as an opportunity cost 
under FERC regulations, with Puget customers effectively 
subsidizing wind following and balancing services.132 Under 
the following service Puget proposes, wind generators within 
Puget’s balancing area would shoulder the cost of balancing 
the intermittency of wind energy.133 
A crucial element of the proposal and its ultimate failure 
was the cost calculation of the service charge. Puget based the 
cost of the charge upon the capital cost of flexible electric 
capacity from a General Electric natural gas peaker generating 
unit.134 Opponents argued that although Puget would 
experience opportunity costs with holding additional reserve 
generation, it would not incur the need for additional 
generating to serve loads; in the worst case scenario when 
                                                
128. Id. ¶ 1. 
129. Id. ¶ 4. 
130. Id. ¶ 4. (If the service is to be provided by a third party, the terms of the 
contract must be acceptable to PSE). 
131. Id. ¶ 3. 
132. Id. at ¶ 8 (explaining that “…dedicating stored hydroelectric capacity for use by 
wind generation would present a steep opportunity cost to Puget’s native load 
customers, and shifting this stored hydroelectric capacity to a wind balancing function 
would inappropriately subsidize the cost of providing following capacity to wind 
generation.”). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. ¶ 9. 
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wind stops blowing Puget would operate just as much 
generation as it would require absent wind on its system and 
therefore the cost of new generating units was not 
representative of their costs.135 Part of Puget’s rationale for 
using the cost of new generation as a proxy for the service 
charge was an insufficient market for following services to 
support new wind generation.136 Without a strong market, 
Puget was forced to rely on hypothetical pricing mechanisms 
instead. 
FERC rejected Puget’s proposal as not meeting the standard 
of “just and reasonable” under the FPA.137 Because the rate 
Puget proposed was hypothetical and not based on any 
demonstrable costs, the charge for the service could potentially 
exceed the actual cost of providing it.138 The terms of rejection 
do not completely rule out approval of a similar following 
service if the rate was more closely based on the cost of 
providing the service. In rejecting Puget’s initial proposal, 
FERC did so without prejudice, welcoming a new rate 
proposal.139 
B. Other Utility Tariff Proposals 
FERC does not expressly state what modifications would be 
required to meet the just and reasonable standard, but other 
similar proposals and the reaction from FERC afford some 
indication.140 In its Puget ruling, FERC suggests that any 
charges should be related to “actual, demonstrable costs 
incurred in providing service.”141 Furthermore, in calculating 
the service charge, Puget must show that the charges will not 
                                                
135. Id. 
136. Amendment to Open Access Transmission Tariff, Schedule 12, Wind 
Integration Within-Hour Generation Following Service, Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 
Docket No.  ER10-1436-000, at 2 (June 14, 2010) (explaining “Unfortunately, a liquid 
market for…flexible capacity does not exist in the Pacific Northwest”) (on file with 
author). 
137. Puget Rejection, supra note 78, ¶ 31; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2011). 
138. Id. ¶ 34. 
139. Id. ¶ 35. 
140. See, e.g., NorthWestern Corp., 129 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116 (2009) [hereinafter 
NorthWestern], order on reh’g, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,202 (2010); Westar Energy Inc., 130 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (2010); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,087 
(2010). 
141. Puget Rejection, supra note 78, ¶¶ 31, 34. 
26
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss1/5
2011] RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION COSTS 207 
 
lead to recoveries beyond the actual costs Puget incurs in 
providing the service.142 
Based upon these requirements it would seem that the only 
way for Puget to evince the cost of their following service is to 
enter into a contract with a generator to actually provide the 
needed service. This suggests that FERC requires more 
thorough analysis than Puget provided.  One way of doing that 
would be to undertake the sort of in-depth “wind integration 
cost study” some utilities have embarked on, or conversely to 
base charges on actual incurred costs where ancillary service 
markets exist and those services can be explicitly procured. In 
rejecting Puget’s request, FERC also acknowledges the 
difficulty of the situation saying, “[c]hanging system 
conditions, such as an increasing amount of wind generation 
described by Puget, present unique challenges that may 
require novel solutions.”143 Other systems are experiencing 
similar strains. 
In a filing from NorthWestern Corp. (NorthWestern), the 
transmission provider proposed that wind resources exporting 
energy to another balancing authority be required to provide 
their own balancing service.144 NorthWestern reasoned that 
the proposal was necessary to ensure customers within its BA 
would not be paying for balancing service without receiving the 
energy produced from the wind generators.145 FERC ruled that 
this proposal conflicted with NorthWestern’s existing 
obligation to offer balancing and following services.146 This 
ruling makes it clear that BAs such as utility companies and 
transmission providers must offer all VERs some kind of 
balancing and following services. The question then becomes 
one of pricing these services; the issue that Puget had 
struggled with. 
One utility has had at least partial success in implementing 
an energy imbalance service charge. Westar Energy Inc. 
(Westar) proposed charging generator regulation services to all 
resources exporting energy out of Westar’s balancing authority 
                                                
142. Id. ¶ 34. 
143. Id. ¶ 31. 
144. NorthWestern, supra note 140. 
145. Id. ¶ 3. 
146. Id. ¶ 14. 
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area.147 Rather than proposing a standardized service charge 
as Puget had, Westar proposed apportioning the total charge 
between dispatchable resources and VERs based upon their 
respective burdens upon the system.148 FERC accepted this 
proposal on an interim basis until a market for such services 
could be developed.149 While FERC’s acceptance of this 
proposal indicates a willingness to allow energy imbalance 
charges generally, continued focus on market driven pricing 
points to the ultimate goal. A rulemaking currently underway 
at FERC may present a better defined path toward 
implementing comprehensive renewable energy integration 
measures. 
C. FERC Proposed Rulemaking on Renewable Integration 
Measures 
Acknowledging the pressure many utilities and transmission 
operators feel from increasing VERs, FERC has initiated a 
rulemaking reopening many of the issues addressed by Order 
No. 890.150 Two elements of the Proposed Rule would directly 
address renewable integration cost concerns. First, FERC 
proposes to require public utility transmission providers to 
offer intra-hourly transmission scheduling.151 Second, FERC 
proposes to amend the pro forma OATT to include a 
“Generator Regulation and Frequency Response Service” 
(Response Service).152 
The requirement of intra-hourly scheduling is intended to 
better reflect the scheduling constraints of renewable energy, 
resulting in more efficient use of transmission and generation 
resources.153 Giving transmission providers authority to adjust 
schedules within the operating hour allows transmission 
providers to commit fewer resources as reserves to back up the 
variability of renewables.154 
The creation of a pro forma OATT for Response Service will 
                                                
147. Westar Energy Inc., 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, ¶ 1 (2010). 
148. Id. at 35-36. 
149. Id. at 35. 
150. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8. 
151. Id.  ¶ 3. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. ¶ 4. 
154. Id. ¶ 5. 
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allow transmission providers to price integration cost charges 
such as the one proposed by Puget. The proposal would provide 
a generic rate schedule prescribing how transmission providers 
could recover costs from balancing variability from 
generators.155 At the same time, FERC argues that providing 
the generic pro forma tariff schedule increases market 
transparency and competition by informing all market 
participants of the cost of such a service.156 These two 
measures will provide some relief to the stresses renewable 
energy has placed on the system, but in places FERC has not 
gone far enough. 
VI. TAKING THE NEXT STEP IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 
INTEGRATION 
The notice of inquiry for FERC’s proposed rulemaking 
stimulated extensive reaction from utility companies, 
renewable generators, and government agencies.157 The 
Proposed Rule addresses some concerns relating to integration 
costs and scheduling constraints. Yet the proposal from FERC 
backs away from significant opportunities to create more liquid 
markets for VERs and ancillary services. The following section 
will discuss how close FERC comes to achieving the stated goal 
of removing practices that unduly discriminate against 
variable energy resources.158 
A. Requiring Shorter Uniform Scheduling Blocks 
FERC’s proposal requiring transmission providers to 
schedule generation in smaller time increments would 
undoubtedly improve market conditions for renewable energy 
generators. Bonneville Power Administration, a utility and 
balancing authority with large amounts of wind energy, has 
estimated that scheduling in ten-minute increments could 
reduce system integration costs by eighty percent.159 Others 
                                                
155. Id. ¶ 5. 
156. Id. ¶ 5. 
157. See FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, et seq. (discussing various comments 
received from over 130 different commenters following the notice of inquiry). 
158. Id. at Summary. 
159. Bart McManus, Bonneville Power Administration Wind Integration Technical 
Lead, Large Wind Integration Challenges and Solutions for Operations/System 
Reliability, at slide 26 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.uwig.org/Denver/ 
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have estimated integration cost reductions of forty to sixty 
percent depending on different balancing authority 
characteristics such as the amount of VERs, system load, and 
other measures taken to integrate the VERs into the system.160 
These cost reductions come from a number of different 
places. First, the shorter intervals allow more precise 
scheduling that reflects the rapid changes in output from wind 
generators, ultimately allowing more accurate system 
forecasts.161 More accurate scheduling means fewer reserves 
must be scheduled to balance any variability from renewable 
resources. 
Second, changing the scheduling intervals provides system 
flexibility at a very low cost. NERC reliability requirements 
force transmission providers to procure expensive balancing 
reserves in hourly increments to match the scheduling of the 
variable energy.162 Flexibility can be created at a lower cost by 
allowing shorter scheduling blocks. These shorter scheduling 
blocks allow transmission providers to maximize reliability 
simply through more dynamic resource scheduling and without 
procurement of additional resources.163 A system operator can 
schedule a VER when it is available even if that is only a short 
period of time. These shorter scheduling chunks also mean 
that system operators can purchase the following services in 
smaller increments. Allowing scheduling which more closely 
follows the characteristics of the generation ultimately allows 
for more efficient operation of the system as a whole. 
Third, NERC expects that intra-hour scheduling will allow 
                                                
McManus.pdf (“10 minute schedule changes would solve ~80% of the [integration] 
issues BPA is anticipating.”) 
160. Avista Corporation, Wind Integration Study, Table 24: Effect on Integration 
Cost of Short-Term Liquid Markets 48 (2007), available at http://www.uwig.org/ 
AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf. 
161. Response of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council to the Notice of 
Inquiry Addressing Integration of Variable Energy Resources, FERC Docket No. 
RM10-11-000, at 6-7 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter WECC Response], available at 
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=12309166:0. 
162. Comments of the American Wind Energy Association, FERC Docket No. RM10-
11-000, at 38 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter AWEA Comments], available at 
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=1
2315786:0. 
163. MICHAEL MILLIGAN & BRENDAN KIRBY, IMPACT OF BALANCING AREA SIZE, 
OBLIGATION SHARING, AND RAMPING CAPABILITY ON WIND INTEGRATION 27-29,  
available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2007/ 
milligan_wind_integration_impacts.pdf. 
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systems to respond to events in real time. These smaller 
scheduling blocks provide more accurate market data for 
providers of ancillary services, such as balancing reserves.164 
More accurate market data will lead to more efficient and 
economic scheduling and greater competition among service 
providers. 
Taken together, the most significant overall effect of intra-
hour scheduling should be a reduced need for VER balancing 
from other resources. NERC anticipates revisiting its 
reliability requirements because of the expected decrease in 
demand for balancing resources.165 Such a measure by NERC 
would reduce the amount of following capacity BAs would be 
required to carry to meet reliability standards and thus reduce 
the overall cost of VER integration. 
FERC proposes requiring intra-hour scheduling in fifteen-
minute increments, creating four scheduling blocks for each 
hour.166 The determination of the ideal time increment is 
described as a trade-off between improved reliability from 
more flexible scheduling and the cost of the updated 
infrastructure necessary to implement the requirement.167 By 
electing the fifteen-minute time interval, FERC believes it is 
choosing the increment which will create the lowest burden on 
system infrastructure while still providing the flexibility 
needed by VERs.168 
FERC chose a maximum scheduling interval of fifteen 
minutes in the face of pressure to provide a more flexible 
standard. Formal comments from numerous entities 
responsible for system operations urged FERC not to adopt a 
rigid standard.169 FERC should not cave in to this pressure. By 
                                                
164. Comments of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation in Response 
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s January 21, 2010 Notice of Inquiry on 
the Integration of Variable Energy Resources, FERC Docket No. RM10-11-000, at 17-
18 (Apr. 12, 2010) [hereinafter NERC Response], available at 
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=1
2314664:0. 
165. NERC Response, supra note 164, at 17-18. 
166. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 37. 
167. WECC Response, supra note 161, at 7. 
168. NERC Response, supra note 164, at 17-18 (concluding that the ideal range of 
time increments would be five to fifteen minutes depending on system characteristics). 
169. See, e.g., Comments of the Edison Electric Institute, FERC Docket No. RM 10-
11-000, at 8-9 (Apr. 2010) available at  http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/ 
advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=12314178:0 (claiming that because “of 
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mandating a standard scheduling increment, which all 
transmission providers will be required to provide, FERC 
creates common market rules. At the same time the fifteen-
minute interval operates only as a maximum. Transmission 
providers will still be allowed to offer scheduling in smaller 
increments if they find it appropriate or advantageous. 
Standard scheduling will make it easier for renewable 
generators to schedule and sell their product to different BAs. 
The current proposal encourages compatibility while still 
allowing individual BAs to customize their scheduling 
practices as necessary. 
FERC must still be vigilant though, because this limited 
flexibility can allow barriers to persist. If one BA schedules 
power in ten-minute increments and a neighboring BA 
schedules power in eight-minute increments, generators may 
have a difficult time scheduling between the two. FERC should 
further encourage BAs to have consistent scheduling practices 
across regions. By mandating intra-hour scheduling in 
compatible intervals, FERC can significantly reduce the cost of 
renewable integration and improve overall system 
performance. 
B. Charging Renewable Generators for Ancillary Services 
In allocating integration costs FERC analogizes renewable 
VERs with variability on the customer side of the electric 
meter. The new Response Service proposed by FERC would be 
priced using the same cost assessment for balancing customer 
load variability.170 According to FERC, regulation of customer 
load and regulation of generation are functionally equivalent 
because both are designed to recover the costs of holding 
regulation reserve capacity to meet system variability.171 This 
argument may not fully consider the different benefits of 
increased renewable energy compared to regulation of 
                                                
the variation in market structure and rules throughout the county, it is unlikely that 
any single scheduling practice will suit all regions.”); Comments of the Bonneville 
Power Administration, FERC Docket No. RM10-11-000, at 6 (Apr. 2010) available at 
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=1
2314631:0 (urging FERC not to mandate intra-hour scheduling but instead allow 
regional cost-benefit analyses). 
170. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 92–94. 
171. Id. ¶ 93. 
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customer load. Costs should fall upon all those who receive 
benefits from renewable energy. 
Because the resource requirements are functionally the 
same for balancing customer load and generator output, FERC 
argues that the pricing mechanisms should also be consistent. 
This argument does not consider where the costs of Response 
Service will land in relation to the benefits of the service. 
Under the customer load-balancing tariff, the transmission 
customer taking energy off of the grid pays for the balancing 
service.172 The cost of the service is then placed on electric 
utilities that are the direct transmission customers and that 
cost is then passed on to utility customers. In paying for this 
service, utility customers gain the ability to cycle their 
electricity without service disruptions. The small variations in 
electricity caused by turning the lights on or starting the 
dishwasher are addressed by this balancing service. The cost of 
the service is then spread across the entire utility ratepayer 
base - the primary beneficiaries of the service. 
Placing a similar charge upon variable renewable energy 
generators disconnects the placement of costs from the 
benefits. While there are costs associated with integrating 
renewable energy, it may not be appropriate for these costs to 
be borne solely by renewable generators. In efforts to treat all 
generators neutrally, FERC has lost sight of the policy goals 
that have stimulated growth in renewable energy.173 
Renewable energy policies offer broad public benefits such as 
reduced pollution, increased energy security, and mitigation of 
global warming.174 As a result, while renewable generators 
should undoubtedly shoulder some of the burden, the costs for 
bringing renewable energy to the grid should also be shared 
more broadly. 
The proposed service may be fair in the sense that it uses 
the same metrics to calculate the cost of similar services. 
However, in allocating those costs, the service could still be 
seen to unduly discriminate against renewable energy 
                                                
172. Order No. 890, supra note 107, at Open Access Transmission Tariff Schedule 3, 
Tariff Sheet No. 131 (explaining, “The Transmission Customer must either purchase 
this service from the Transmission Provider or make alternative comparable 
arrangements…”). 
173. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 93 (recounting FERC’s policy to utilize the 
same rate structure for customer load and generator imbalance service). 
174. See supra Part II.A.. 
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providers. Though the benefits of renewable energy are spread 
widely, the cost of integrating those resources will be focused 
solely on the generators bringing the energy to market. The 
distribution of the costs of the Response Service will have an 
important impact on the ability of renewable energy to 
compete with other resources. FERC should more carefully 
consider where these costs are placed. 
C. Creation of a More Liquid Market for Reserve Generation 
The policies in the Proposed Rule do provide some direction 
to system operators and generators to move ahead with 
renewable integration, but it leaves out an important piece of 
the puzzle. Even if FERC does choose to go forward with the 
new Response Service, the Commission has failed on its own 
terms to provide a proper pricing mechanism for the service. 
FERC rejected Puget’s following service proposal because of 
the reliance on a hypothetical proxy-generating unit for 
pricing. However, Puget chose to use a proxy for pricing in part 
because there was, “no existing liquid market for the flexible 
capacity in the region.”175 
1. FERC should continue to pursue virtual balancing 
authorities 
FERC should encourage the creation of liquid local and 
regional markets for flexible capacity. Liquid markets would 
allow competitive pricing for ancillary services. It would also 
address the shortcomings of Puget’s following service proposal 
by providing a reliable baseline upon which to base the service 
charge. Creating these markets is more easily said than done. 
In the Notice of Inquiry leading up to FERC’s Proposed 
Rule, the Commission asked for feedback on creation of a 
“virtual balancing authority” (virtual BA).176 Though not fully 
developed, the concept would allow VERs across a large 
geographic area to virtually combine into a single BA required 
to meet the NERC reliability standards. While FERC left the 
concept open to the interpretation of stakeholders, the virtual 
                                                
175. Puget Rejection, supra note 78, ¶ 33. 
176. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, Notice of Inquiry, 130 FERC ¶ 61,053, 
¶ 33 (Jan. 21, 2010) available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/IDMWS/nvcommon/ 
NVViewer.asp?Doc=12249929:0. 
34
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss1/5
2011] RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION COSTS 215 
 
BA concept presumably allows aggregated renewable 
generators to offset their own variability. Several comments to 
the Notice of Inquiry endorsed the general concept of 
aggregating variable resources as a positive potential 
measure.177 It is argued that the creation of such a virtual BA 
may not require additional authorization from FERC so long 
as NERC reliability requirements are met.178 Regardless, 
explicit endorsement and a regulatory roadmap from FERC 
would further encourage the creation of these virtual BAs. 
In the current proposed rule from FERC there is no mention 
of a virtual BA, and FERC seems to have abandoned attempts 
to expand or create more liquid markets for variable energy 
resources. The hurdles for setting up such a BA are 
substantial, but not insurmountable.179 To begin the process, a 
significant number of generators would need to agree on terms 
and proceed with establishing a BA. Such a BA would still be 
subject to NERC reliability standards and would need to 
procure balancing resources to moderate variability across the 
virtual BA. Allowing more renewable resources to balance each 
other could reduce the overall need for balancing resources 
ultimately reducing integration costs. 
2. FERC must focus on new ways to create liquid markets for 
renewable resources and ancillary services 
In seeking comment about the viability of a virtual BA for 
VERs, FERC asked the wrong question. FERC rejected Puget’s 
proposal in part because the proposed following cost was not 
based on any functioning liquid market for flexible capacity or 
ancillary services. With that, FERC’s inquiry should focus on 
the creation of a liquid market for ancillary services such as 
the proposed Response Service to ensure that such services are 
properly priced.180 Creation of virtual balancing authorities for 
variable resources may also benefit renewables but will not 
                                                
177. See, e.g., WECC Response, supra note 161, at 9 (with all other factors being 
equal, larger balancing authorities are better equipped to reduce variability by 
aggregating variable resources). 
178. See Carol Opartny & Malcolm McLellan, Power System Balancing Authority 
Innovation, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2011). 
179. Id. 
180. See AWEA Comments, supra note 162, at 54-55 (discussing the benefit of 
region-wide load following markets and ancillary services markets). 
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necessarily stimulate a robust ancillary services market.181 
Functioning markets for ancillary services address the 
immediate problem of properly pricing the services to avoid 
discrimination against the generators forced to buy them. 
As an alternative to ancillary service markets, FERC’s 
Proposed Rule does allow variable resources the option of “self-
supply” by entering bi-lateral contracts with generators to 
provide ancillary services.182 This does hold the potential to 
create a secondary market for ancillary services in places 
where there is sufficient market demand. However, basing the 
market on bilateral contracting will inherently restrict the 
markets liquidity and does not encourage efficient use of 
resources. This first step towards an ancillary service market 
does not go far enough. 
FERC should attempt to meet its own demands by proposing 
policies to create unconstrained liquid ancillary service 
markets and increase access to these markets. This can be 
done by creating virtual BAs made up instead of peaker power 
plants able to provide ancillary services more easily across a 
wider region. In addition, FERC can make it easier for 
renewable generators and other balancing resources to form 
their own BAs and allowing them to negotiate their own costs 
for balancing services. Other market participants are likely to 
provide additional ideas as well. 
In the Proposed Rule, FERC failed to initiate a serious 
discussion of measures to create liquid ancillary services. As a 
result, no consensus exists around the universe of options for 
achieving such markets. FERC must focus new regulatory 
efforts on creation of liquid ancillary service markets to 
properly and competitively price the overall integration of 
renewable energy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Since the adoption of Order No. 890 in 2007, renewable 
VERs have continued to grow placing additional strains on 
transmission providers to manage the variability. FERC’s 
Proposed Rule to remove barriers to the growth of renewable 
                                                
181. See Kirby, supra note 52 (virtual balancing authorities may actually reduce the 
overall demand for ancillary services by allowing the renewable resources themselves 
to perform some of the balancing). 
182. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 89. 
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energy resources acknowledge this growing problem.183 The 
requirement of intra-hourly scheduling represents a significant 
cost savings for the integration of renewable energy into 
electric transmission systems. 
By requiring compatible intervals for intra-hour scheduling, 
FERC can further increase cooperation across BA boundaries. 
However, the proposal to add additional ancillary service 
charges for renewable generators should be reevaluated. 
Charging renewable generators for the cost of integration does 
not acknowledge that the benefits of renewable energy are 
spread broadly. Integration costs should not be shouldered 
solely by the generators and FERC should investigate ways to 
spread these costs more evenly. 
Finally, FERC should not abandon attempts to create more 
robust market options for variable renewable resources and 
the ancillary services required to balance variability. 
Endorsing the self-supply option is a small first step to 
creating more robust markets for ancillary services. However, 
FERC must look further into the future; as renewable energy 
generation continues to increase, so will the need to manage 
resource variability. Robust liquid markets in both variable 
renewable resources and ancillary services will represent a 
significant improvement in the long-term viability of 
renewable energy resources. 
 
                                                
183. Id. at Summary. 
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